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Natural scientists have proposed that humankind has entered a new geologic epoch. 
Termed the “Anthropocene,” this new reality revolves around the central role of human 
activity in multiple Earth ecosystems. That challenge requires a rethinking of social science 
explanations of organization and environment relationships. In this article, we discuss the 
need to politicize institutional theory as a means understanding “Anthropocene Society,” 
and in turn what that resultant society means for the Anthropocene in the natural 
environment. We modify the constitutive elements of institutional orders and a set of main 
change mechanisms to explore three scenarios around which future Anthropocene 
Societies might be built – Collapsing Systems, Market Rules, and Cultural Re-
Enlightenment. Simultaneously, we use observations from the Anthropocene to expose 
limitations in present institutional theory and propose extensions to remedy them. Overall, 
this article challenges organizational scholars to consider a new paradigm under which 




Institutional Theory, Anthropocene Society, Organizational Fields, Institutional Change, 
Scenarios, Political Power 
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“The Anthropocene represents a new phase in the history of both humankind and 
of the Earth, when natural forces and human forces became intertwined, so that the 
fate of one determines the fate of the other. Geologically, this is a remarkable 




While the “modern” environmental movement, which began in the early 1960s, has 
animated much of the research on sustainability thus far, the human species is now facing a 
unique moment in history, one in which our influence on the natural environment has shifted 
from controlling and damaging a variety of local ecosystems to now shaping several ecosystems 
on the global scale, sometimes with catastrophic effects (Diamond, 2005). Geoscientists have 
labeled the new physical reality the “Anthropocene” (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000), an era in 
which humans have a long-term, documentable impact, not only on the operation of the planet’s 
terrestrial ecosystems but also on its hydrosphere, cryosphere, biosphere, lithosphere (Hamilton, 
2016) and indeed, its’ very geological strata (Crutzen, 2002; Zalasiewicz, Williams, Steffen & 
Crutzen, 2010). Researchers have labeled the socio-economic sphere that mirrors this 
geophysical reality, “Anthropocene Society” (Hoffman & Jennings, 2015, 2018; Pallson et al., 
2013; Seidl et al., 2011). Engaged study of this emerging reality represents a new focus that 
should dominate the focus of studies of organizations and the natural environment going 
forward, taking Stephen Jay Gould’s (1991) observation to heart: “we have become…the 
stewards of life's continuity on earth. We did not ask for this role, but we cannot abjure it. We 
may not be suited to it, but here we are.”  
In this article, we respond to Gould’s call by drawing upon a middle ground perspective 
using institutional theory, which emphasizes both the socially constructed nature of reality while 
also considering the paths of institutional evolution and change. There are many possible 
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Anthropocene Societies, each requiring fundamental shifts in the beliefs and social rules 
concerning our conceptions of humans, the natural environment and their interconnections. Each 
possible future has implications for particular constituencies – corporations, scientists, 
politicians, community, the poor, religious members and virtually all segments of society – and 
institutional theory is uniquely situated for attending to such differentiated and often conflicting 
interests.  
Yet, institutional theory is still somewhat incomplete for our purposes. While it has been 
more focused on change since the early 2000s (Dacin et al., 2002), it is criticized for being too 
concerned with isomorphism, the static, the status quo (Westwood & Clegg, 2009) and with 
social systems to the exclusion of natural systems (Hoffman & Ventresca, 2002). In this article, 
we argue that political power has received less attention from institutional theorists than is 
warranted (Greenwood et. al., 2008; Lawrence et al., 2001; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Therefore, 
we seek to further adjust institutional theory by incorporating political power more explicitly 
within possible scenarios for future Anthropocene Societies and in the consideration of paths for 
change towards them. We do so by drawing on notions of agency, interests, manipulation, and 
defiance to conceptualize different scenarios of the Anthropocene and their implications.  
This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we briefly review conceptualizations 
of the Anthropocene by physical scientists. In the second section, we turn to a more politically 
focused institutional framework for assessing Anthropocene Society. In the third section, we 
discuss three scenarios of society in the Anthropocene, each having distinct institutional-political 
features. In the final section and conclusion, we turn to different ways of building on our 
institutional-political theory and, more specifically, of researching key elements of Anthropocene 
Society.  
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The Nature of the Anthropocene 
The Anthropocene is a shift in our physical reality that is marked as a new geological epoch, one 
in which human activity has become such a significant influence on the operation of 
environmental systems that the effects are now detectable in the geophysical strata of the planet. 
In the growing literature on the Anthropocene, three approaches have appeared elaborating this 
notion.  The first is the Anthropocene as the “Great Acceleration” (Crutzen, 2002; Crutzen & 
Stoermer, 2000; IPCC, 2017; Monastersky, 2015; Steffen, Crutzen & McNeil, 2007; Zalasiewicz 
et al, 2016). The concept is focused on the past up to the present and on drivers such as rapid 
increases in population growth, trade volume, urbanization and other dimensions. These drivers 
have caused a diverse array of negative human impacts on the environment since the beginning 
of human recorded history (around 2500 B.C.), but with geometric growth since the Industrial 
Revolution.  
The second is the “Planetary Boundary” (PB) perspective, which concentrates on the 
present up to the near future. PBs are part of system in which each boundary represents key 
environmental vectors and “thresholds below which humanity can safely operate and beyond 
which the stability of planetary-scale systems cannot be relied upon” (Rockström et al., 2009). 
The boundaries today are: (1) climate change, (2) novel entities (notably chemicals), (3) 
stratospheric ozone depletion, (4) atmospheric aerosol loading (notably particulates), (5) ocean 
acidification, (6) biogeochemical flows (nitrogen and phosphorous), (7) freshwater use, (8) land-
system change (notably deforestation), and (9) biosphere integrity (notably biodiversity loss) 
(Gillings & Hagan-Lawson, 2014; Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015; Stockholm 
Resilience Center, 2016). Each boundary can be both crossed into an unsafe zone and then re-
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crossed back into safe zones – as is the case with ozone depletion.  
The third conceptualization considers the future that may follow and embraces the notion 
of collapses. It draws on broader research on civilization’s various downfalls (Diamond, 2005, 
2012; Ferguson, 2008; Wright & Nyberg, 2016) and on more specific research on specific 
extinctions (Kolbert, 2014). These collapses in the past include large scale events, such as the 
crash of the Mayan Civilization, Easter Island, or Viking populations in Greenland as well as 
industry level failures, such as the collapse of the Atlantic Northwest cod fisheries in the early 
1990s due to over-harvesting. In all of these cases, there were evident warnings within and 
around the affected groups, yet there was an inability to halt the decline in the early stages, 
leading to rapid decline and lagged responses in latter stages (Diamond, 2012). Many today are 
warning that we are now seeing such warning signs, notably around what is called the “Sixth 
Extinction” (Kolbert, 2014).  
All three approaches to elaborating the Anthropocene offer different temporal glimpses 
into the composite whole, as well as slightly different drivers and outcomes. We draw primarily 
on the second - the systems view of various Planetary Boundaries - with an eye to the other two. 
Ultimately, to avoid a dystopian future for Anthropocene Society, in our view, we must focus on 
the science of different ecosystems and the environmental vectors captured by PBs. Not crossing 
such boundaries requires that we change our social, cultural and institutional environment. To 
explore that further, we turn to institutional theory, both as it has been applied and as it may be 
adjusted. 
 
An Institutional-Political Framework for Conceptualizing Anthropocene Societies 
Institutional theory begins with the premise that all aspects of the Anthropocene, including the 
8 | P a g e  
 
science that been used to identify it, are socially constructed; that is, recognized 
phenomenologically through language and culture (Hoffman & Jennings, 2015, 2018). That 
construction represents a “collective rationality” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 
1992), a pattern of belief and practice that is widely taken for granted as a type of institution or 
logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). As such, institutional logics and their 
manifestations in particular social orders are the basis for understanding whether and how 
science and technical measures will be incorporated into societal structures. These logics are akin 
to orders of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006), which rely on different underlying rationales 
of justification for thought and action in the production of organizational order and change (Jagd, 
2011), though logics are both more constitutive of orders and less malleable by individuals 
(Thornton et al., 2012, p. 78)   
Some collective rationalities and social logics are more aligned with, and amenable to, 
the aforementioned conceptualization of the Anthropocene than others. Therefore, it is important 
to understand how both the particular logics and social orders that are constructed and negotiated 
and the relative stability of such logics and orders – whether they can be changed to address 
Anthropocene issues. In this section, we offer a simplified sketch of this construction and change 
process, one built upon current institutional theory (Jennings & Hoffman, 2017; Thornton et al., 
2012) in consideration of kindred notions like orders of worth. Two moderate – and one large – 
distinctions are evident in our depiction. The first is that we discuss only what we consider to be 
the key elements of institutional orders – organizational fields, institutions and logics -- and main 
change mechanism in the institutional orders – disruptive events and institutional entrepreneurs. 
The second is that we re-emphasize the role of relational fields relative to logics and of 
disruptions relative to internal change. The third, and largest, distinction is that we extend these 
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elements and mechanisms to more completely address the profoundly unique context that the 
Anthropocene provides. In particular, we examine political power, manipulation and defiance 
which are emphasized by critical theorists (Clegg, 2010; Forbes & Jermier, 2012; Gladwin, 
2012; Khan, Munir & Willmott, 2007; Leca & Naccache, 2006; Levy, 1997; Levy & 
Lichtenstein, 2012; Munir, 2015) in order to adjust institutional theory towards new and 
provocative forms. With the help of Table 1, we will discuss each of these institutional elements 
and mechanisms, as well as the political power-related extensions for each. 
 
--- Insert Table 1 about here --- 
 
The Organizational Field.  
Mainstream institutional theory, as displayed in Table 1, views an organizational field as “a 
community of organizations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants 
interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (Scott, 
1995, p. 56). It may include constituents such as the government, critical exchange partners, 
sources of funding, professional and trade associations, special interest groups, and the general 
public — any constituent which imposes a coercive, normative or cognitive influence on the 
organization (Scott, 1991). Centered around the physical proximity of actors (Warren, 1967), 
common industry sectors (e.g. SIC codes) or consequential issues (Hoffman, 1999), fields are 
richly contextualized domains in which collective understandings regarding matters of 
importance for the field and society emerge.  
But a more political reading of fields sees them as relational spaces where multiple and 
often competing interests engage with other actors who may hold divergent ideas about the 
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nature of the world around them (McAdam & Boudet, 2012; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). 
Therefore, the definition of field membership becomes consequential as it determines who has 
voice in defining the problems we face and the available suite of solutions that can applied to 
solve them (Lawrence, 1999). The process of engagement resembles an institutional “war” 
(White, 1992) within “arenas of power relations” (Brint & Karabel, 1991, p. 355) where actors 
address criticisms or valuations through negotiated processes of justifications and compromise 
(Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). As such, an analysis of Anthropocene Society must recognize that 
there are multiple field constituents that compete in multiple politically inflected fields over the 
institutions that define what the Anthropocene means for who we are today and who we will 
become tomorrow (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010).  
Beyond adding a more contested conceptualization of the field, there are two additional 
limitations to mainstream institutional theory’s conception of the field that must be addressed. 
One additional limitation is that institutional theory directs all attention to those with “voice” in 
institutional debates. In other words, it focuses on the elites of society that have the power to 
project and protect their interests within field level debates by defining the issues and develop 
the solutions. But the impacts of the Anthropocene will be felt across the social spectrum, with 
differential impacts on the poor, disenfranchised and disconnected. Elites of rich countries, for 
example, will be far more able to adapt to the impacts of climate change than those in the low-
lying areas of developing countries (e.g. Bangladesh) or poorer cities (e.g. New Orleans). The 
bias in institutional theory towards these elites creates a blind spot to considering issues of 
equity, fairness and environmental justice in institutional outcomes (Bullard, 2005; Taylor, 
2000), one that is compounded with its inability to recognize the interests of future generations 
(Lovbrand et al., 2015). Institutional theory will only take notice of such groups when they are 
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sufficiently aggrieved and able to amass the requisite power to voice their concerns. But 
certainly, foresight of such environmentally induced aggrievement is important for 
understanding the emergence of social instability, social movement mobilization and institutional 
action.  
Additionally, the field ignores the “interests” of the natural environment within what is an 
inherently social construct. Within institutional theory, social actors interpret, assess and 
represent the interests of the natural environment. “Nature” itself does not have voice.  While 
scientists and environmental NGOs may play a role in articulating the concerns over climate 
change and other natural environment problems (Hoffman, 2011; Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012), the 
contested nature of these debates and the willingness of some to discount or outright reject the 
results of scientific analyses that contradict their worldview leaves the social dimension of 
Anthropocene Society woefully inadequate. In fact, some speculate that the introduction of 
nature by giving voice to non-humans and future generations within the development of 
institutional orders creates challenges for the orders of worth framework (Boltanski & Thévenot, 
2006) as it requires which evokes notions of deep ecology (Lafaye & Thévenot, 1993).  
Further, the emergence of catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Harvey in Houston, 
cannot be deemed irrelevant to field level debates, whether social actors articulate their presence 
or not. Where prior attempts to integrate the natural environment into social analyses (Catton & 
Dunlap, 1980) had limited success (Hannigan, 1995), the new context of the Anthropocene 
elevates the natural environment as something that is no longer an “external” constraint or 
limitation. It is now “internal” to our social structures as humans take charge of ecosystem 
operation and stability (Nyberg & Wright, 2016). As such, it cannot be ignored in any accurate 
social modeling.  
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A second limitation in mainstream institutional is the enduring, underlying view that 
fields mature, becoming more isomorphic and static (Donaldson, 2001; Westwood & Clegg, 
2009). In the work of White (1992), network relations could give rise to structural arrangements 
that make particular types of fields identifiable and even robust (Padgett & Ansell, 1991; 
Simmel, 1955). But in Anthropocene Society, the natural environment will intrude on and 
become part of these fields in fundamental ways, creating an increasingly dynamic nature of a 
politicized relational field. Periodic, unpredictable events around climate change and the other 
threshold barriers will increase in frequency and strength. These include more severe storms, 
rising sea level, droughts, wildfires, species migration and extinction, and the migration of 
vector-borne diseases. Such events could become triggers for coalescing social constituents into 
loose networks towards action (Perrow, 1999). But the variability in these events, their slow 
surge-like nature, and the inability (or unwillingness) of many in society to ascribe these events 
to the Anthropocene all tend to dampen social mobilization (Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). A 
fundamental acceptance of the Anthropocene Era would mean the incorporation of notions of 
shifts, variation, complexity, and the consequent need for adaptation directly into 
conceptualizations of relational fields and their dynamic structures. 
 
Institutions and Logics.  
Field level contestation, if stabilized and cohering around a set of beliefs and practices, becomes 
a form of institution, which in turn provides increased stability and collective meaning to social 
behavior along three dimensions: the regulative (e.g. regulation), normative (e.g. occupational 
standards, educational curricula) and cognitive (e.g. taken for granted cultural rules) (Scott, 
1995; Zucker, 1988). Taken as a whole, these three “pillars” of an institution form a composite 
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within a given context. If encompassing at the field level, an institution is termed a “logic” 
(Thornton, 2001). This logic entails considerations for the issues within the field that are 
perceived as important, the bases of legitimacy and authority for beliefs and the likely strategies, 
norms and control mechanisms for guiding action (Thornton et al., 2012, p. 56).  Indeed, there 
are some generic logics that seem to be observable in various broad areas of social life around 
which collective belief and action tend to cohere. These include our collective conceptions of the 
nature of the State, the market, corporation, profession, family and religion (Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Thornton et al., 2012).  
Similarly, when focusing on orders of worth, Boltanski and Thévenot (2006) have 
identified six that underpin social structure: “the market (in which ‘worthy’ objects are 
considered in terms of profit maximization and competition); the industrial (emphasizing 
science, productivity and instrumental relationships); the domestic (which values attachment, 
hierarchy and honesty); the civic (emphasizing civic solidarity, the collective and delegation); 
the inspired (emphasizing charisma, creation and uniqueness) and an order based on fame 
(reputation, public opinion and success)” (Finch, Geiger & Harkness, 2017, p. 75). To these six 
orders, Thévenot, Moody and Lavaye (2000) have added a seventh “green” order which 
emphasizes sustainability, the ecosystem and future generations.  
Within any specific relational field, two or more specific variants of these logics or orders 
are likely to co-exist or compete as filters for perception and frames for action (Pache & Santos, 
2010). As the tensions around this competition increase, these logics or orders can be reconciled 
through three different types of agreement: “clarification in one – dominating – world only at the 
expense of the other competing worlds; the local arrangement aimed at a temporary and local 
agreement around specific decisions; and the compromise aimed at a more durable agreement 
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constructed on the basis of different worlds. The compromise is consolidated by specific 
constructions (dispositifs) that present a common justification based on different worlds” (Jagd, 
2011, p. 347). As such, our perceptions of the nature of the Anthropocene, its threats, 
opportunities, realities and illusions will be shaped by the institutions, logics and orders of worth 
that prevail within a relational field.  
In our political reading of institutional theory, every logic within a field also ensconces 
power relations and solidifies inequalities (Clegg, 2010; Munir, 2015) through which agency, 
types of control, and methods of contestation are either defined or shaped by the dominant 
logic(s). For example, if the predominant logic is based around the capitalist market logic or 
order of worth, it will be anchored on the notion of individual competition in free (mostly 
unregulated) markets, where “financial risk” and “economic impact” would become the most 
immediate translations of the natural world into social facts. The pursuit of this self-interest by 
privileged individual agents (such as corporations, banks, and stock exchanges), even if it leads 
to inequities in outcomes, will be considered morally just (Friedman, 1970; Rand, 1957). This is 
linked to Boltanski and Thevenot’s notion of “principles of justification,” which are associated 
with different orders of worth (2006). Yet, these justifications, like claims to legitimacy, are 
ultimately more instrumental and self-interested in this political reading of institutions. In other 
words, taking up our prior example, the responsibilities of business, and business managers is 
viewed to be to themselves and their shareholders, with little to no regard for concerns like social 
responsibility and collective concern. As such, social structures and institutions would be biased 
towards the benefit of certain constituencies (e.g. those with financial resources) more than 
others (Piketty, 2014).  
Alternatively, if the predominant logic were structured around a particular religion or 
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order of worth centered on the inspiration or civic worlds, the social facts regarding the 
Anthropocene would be expressed around scripture, God, and virtues (e.g. love, charity and 
hope), such as those expressed in religious texts such as the Bible, Torah or Quran. So, while the 
market logic may result in clean technology innovations, like electric vehicles, LED lightbulbs or 
“clean coal” sequestration that direct financial benefits to the developer, the religious logic or 
inspiration order may highlight the “new paradigms and forms of power derived from 
technology” and the poor’s lack of “financial activities or resources which can enable them to 
adapt to climate change or to face natural disasters” (Pope Francis, 2015, p. 14). In short, the 
religious logic highlights that the poor have full voice in their sense of the field, but have no 
voice in a field dominated by a market logic.  
 
Institutional Change Mechanisms.  
Change in the field is often precipitated by “cultural anomalies” (Hoffman & Jennings, 2015) 
which create contradictions within the social environment (Seo & Creed, 2002) and force 
organizations to reanalyze their surroundings (Kuhn, 1962) and seek to either dominate or 
compromise towards a durable agreement (or “settlement”) constructed on the basis of multiple 
orders (Schildt & Perkmann, 2017). These disruptive events can take many specific forms: 
hostile takeovers (Davis, 1991), regulatory changes (Edelman, 1992), environmental 
catastrophes (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001), rituals (Anand & Watson, 2004), or terrorism (Bail 
2012) and help push fields into what Kuhn (1962) refers to as “revolutionary science,” a period 
in which the exploration of alternatives to taken-for-granted assumptions takes place to make 
sense of the anomalous event (Pride, 1995). While the field and institution-specific dynamics 
that result from these shocks are less focused, planned and agentic than some suggest (Hoffman 
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& Ocasio, 2001; Thornton et al., 2012), they are cultural challenges which are perceived and 
acted upon through social filters and resolved through complex political dynamics and conflict.  
A challenge within the Anthropocene is that no single event is likely to create complete 
disruptions of the interlocked, complex institutional orders in society (Perrow, 2010; Stockholm 
Resilience Center, 2016). Paradoxically, because the Anthropocene is marked by a constellation 
of disruptions, one response has been to accept these cumulating events as the “new normal.” 
Therefore, theorizing the ways in which such complex event ecologies can precipitate 
revolutionary change within Anthropocene Society is needed to expand institutional theory in 
new and novel directions.  
From a more political perspective on institutional processes, institutional entrepreneurs 
look to periods of flux as opportunities for strategic action in which they seek to solidify their 
position by either reproducing the status quo or by acting as brokers for new forms of relations 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Jennings et al., 2014; Lawrence, 1999; McAdam, 2012). Such 
actors craft strategic responses and tactics that allow them to shape the discourse, norms and 
structures that guide organizational action and beliefs (Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004; 
Oliver, 1991). But these institutional entrepreneurs do not act alone or in isolation. Individual 
agents form political networks and coalitions to act as “important motors of institution-building, 
deinstitutionalization, and re-institutionalization in organizational fields” (Rao, Monin & 
Durand, 2003, p. 796). Organizational change agents became parts of these collective 
movements, using shared and accumulated resources and power to “overcome historical inertia, 
undermine the entrenched power structures in the field or triumph over alternative projects of 
change” (Guillen, 2006, p. 43) in opposition to others in similarly configured collective 
movements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996; Zald & Useem, 1987).  
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In Anthropocene Society, it will be particularly important for institutional entrepreneurs 
to leverage field level instability and shocks through a recognition of the key institutional 
elements of the event, and the use of evocative messaging or strategic framing (Dutton, Ashford, 
O’Neill & Lawrence, 2001) that is delivered by powerful actors to reach critical audiences 
(Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012; Molotch, 1970). Such framing, however, would need to be coordinated 
over time and place, and have access to communication channels and powerful change agents to 
precipitate action (Nyberg & Wright, 2016). Not all actors possess the political power to access 
such cultural resources. By implication, the work of institutional entrepreneurs must become one 
of defining Anthropocene events in terms and language that can re-frame and re-direct interests 
and actors in fields to re-theorize elements of logics. The linkage of actors would need to include 
not just the educated or allied, but also those who are uneducated and opposed to the mission of 
change or see little benefit in it (Thaler & Sunstein, 2012).  
This brings us back to considerations for environmental justice (Bullard, 2005; Taylor, 
2000) that permeate each institutional element of our analysis of Anthropocene Society. As the 
environment becomes a collective good that is threatened on the global, not just local, levels, one 
in which damage by one is felt by the entirety of humanity, the maintenance-focused nature of 
mainstream institutional theory fails to capture the moral and ethical considerations that 
accompany this new reality. When considering Anthropocene Society, the cool detachment of 
many institutionalists in their analysis of society must give way to a consideration of whether 
these fields, institutions and logics help to create an environment that is inhospitable to human 
life, particularly in communities without a voice in extant field-level discourse. Some studies 
have already begun to predict that certain regions of the world (such as southwest Asia) may be 
unfit for human habitation within the predictable future (Pal, Elfatih & Eltahir, 2016; Siam, 
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Elfatih & Eltahir, 2017). But we rarely hear that concern voiced in mainstream institutional 
analysis. Perhaps one way to begin a correction is to imagine simple caricatures of Anthropocene 
Societies towards which we might work collectively or fall into unwittingly. 
 
Conceptualizing Three Possible Scenarios of Anthropocene Society 
In this section, we present three scenarios of future Anthropocene Society, along with the 
processes by which these scenarios might emerge. Scenario analysis is more commonly used in 
the natural sciences and planning, but has seen increasing use in the social sciences (Bishop, 
Hines & Collins, 2008; Garb, Pulver & VanDeveer, 2008). Scenarios refer to inferred future 
states, where these states may be descriptive or prescriptive in nature and also rely to varying 
degree on past information and analysis (e.g., some may be near future and analytically derived 
and others more distant and prescriptive or visionary). In institutional theory, particularly in its 
classic works, scenarios would be considered variations of ideal types - pure analytical forms - 
manifest in specific evolving social orders, such as capitalism in the new world after the infusion 
of the Protestant Ethic (Weber, 1905). As such, these scenarios represent later social orders 
derived analytically and with descriptive information from prior social orders. Scenarios of 
social orders are also akin to archetypes found in fields (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993; Hoffman 
& Jennings, 2018), as archetypes represent analytic forms composed of design and structural 
elements, but also entail underlying values or interpretive schemes.  
Put more plainly, social scenarios as we use them here are analytical frameworks based 
on current information about social orders and the near future possibilities for those orders. More 
specifically, based on the adjusted central elements and change mechanisms described above 
(fields, institutions and logics, disruptive events, and institutional entrepreneurship) as well as 
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observations from the organization and natural environment literature (Bansal & Hoffman, 2012; 
Georg & Hoffman, 2013; Lawrence et al., 2001; Levy & Spicer, 2013; Perrow, 2011; Wright & 
Nyberg, 2016), we argue that there are at least three scenarios evident in the near future for 
Anthropocene Society: Collapsing Systems, Market Rules, and Cultural Re-Enlightenment 
scenarios (Jennings & Hoffman, 2018). We organize these scenarios in Table 2, presenting each 
scenario’s institutional elements from which is analytically inferred and the likely effects on the 
natural environment in the last row labelled “Anthropocene Dimensional Changes.” This allows 
our adjusted reading of the institutional view to include the natural environment as a key domain. 
 
--- Insert Table 2 about there --- 
 
Before proceeding, note that, as implied by the table, the first and last scenarios represent 
book-ended opposites in our spectrum. The first, Collapsing Systems, is highly dystopian, 
representing highly fragmented organizational fields leading to a divergence of multiple and 
competing institutional logics or orders around recognition of the Anthropocene, and leading to 
little consideration for solutions. The third, Cultural Re-Enlightenment, is more of a distant 
future than the others and is more utopian, representing a compromise and convergence among 
multiple institutional fields, logics and orders that both accept the reality of the Anthropocene 
and change our conceptions of what it means to be human, how the natural environment is 
understood and, most importantly, how the relationship between the two can be reconfigured. In 
between, we offer a mid-range scenario – Market Rules - in which the field level logic and order 
of the market and economic exchange takes precedence. This scenario is based on the 
clarification of one dominating social order at the expense of the other competing orders.  
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Though other immediate future (mid-spectrum) scenarios might be inferred, such as the military 
logic mixed with the authoritarian state as the dominant social order, we focus on Market Rules 
given that it is one of the most commonly drawn upon in contemporary society (Finch, Geiger & 
Harkness, 2017) and therefore high likelihood of emerging in a future Anthropocene Society. If 
we had more space, we would focus also on a second high-likelihood mid-range scenario in 
which the technology logic or industrial order predominate (Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006).  In 
this scenario, Anthropocene Society would prioritize scientific research around climate and 
biodiversity issues (Steffen, Crutzen & McNeil, 2007) with the prevailing logic that good science 
followed by good engineering (e.g. geo-engineering) should be sufficient to address the 
challenges of the Anthropocene (Hoffman & Jennings, 2018). 
 
The Collapsing Systems Scenario.  
As shown in Table 2, this emerging Anthropocene scenario is marked by increasing complexity 
and chaos within the institutional environment, which proceeds towards dysfunction and likely 
collapse in multiple social and environmental domains. Several past collapses have been 
documented in Diamond (2005) and Kolbert (2014), and some future possible collapses have 
been alluded to in Perrow (2010) and Wright and Nyberg (2017). 
In this scenario, the clarity of social relations breaks down as no one actor or movement 
emerges that is able to define the problems or solutions that address them. This results in a 
breakdown of social order that cascades into ecological domains, causing further breakdowns in 
the ecosystem.  These breakdowns begin with isolated collapses, but through linked systems, 
begin to have greater consequences for more distant parts of the economy, world community and 
global natural systems. The speed of change increases as does the lack of control.  For those who 
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seek a stable social, economic and environmental future, this is the most dangerous and 
dystopian of all scenarios. For those who wish to preserve their position within the field and 
continue behavior and thought as before (at least for the short term), this allows maintenance of 
the status quo, but only temporarily as collapses in social and environmental systems make the 
status quo untenable. Yet, conflicted and contested debate continue and confused inertia blocks 
any action. Such arrangements can be maintained as long as those obstructing agreement or 
action maintain their political power. 
In the Collapsing Systems Scenario, the organizational field is a constellation of multiple 
fields, each increasingly independent and complex, linking multiple actors in less predictable 
ways, thereby causing increasing uncertainty (Greenwood, Jennings &  Hinings, 2015). The 
fields include actors focused on the production and distribution of goods, but also state actors, 
corporate actors, scientific agencies, religion and NGOs, along with virtual fields of information. 
As such, there are key mega-institutions that stand within some fields, such as the United 
Nations, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund which seek to present a view of the 
emergent reality based on existing institutional structures, but their voices, most notably those 
from scientific institutions, are unable to deliver knowledge with certainty or authority (Hulme, 
2012) and are blunted by actors offering contrary assessments, such as the fossil-fuel and electric 
utility industries (Oreskes & Conway, 2012) or ideological and libertarian interests. We can see 
elements of this confused social order in today’s debate over climate change as a “climate 
change counter movement” seeks to sow doubt about the reality of climate change and challenge 
the legitimacy and integrity of scientific institutions and analyses (Brulle, 2014). Amplifying this 
confusion and distorting the debate are social media channels such as Google, Facebook, and 
Twitter that further destabilize field level discourse by introducing an increasingly diverse range 
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of viewpoints and “facts” of varying legitimacy. Again, we can see elements of this influence 
today through the labeling of inconvenient truths and uncomfortable realities as "fake news", the 
de-legitimizing of expertise by equating it to mere opinions, the decimation of evidence-based 
reasoning and analyses that are so critical for making thoughtful and objective-as-possible 
decisions, and the hyper polarization of perspectives and worldviews that have made any kind of 
meaningful dialogue or debate fruitless, if not impossible. And finally, many impacted 
constituents will be left out of the debate, causing social protest and disruption of mega-
institutional discussion, which further destabilizes the field.  
The institutions and logics of the field will not solidify around denial of the 
Anthropocene. Instead, they become increasingly fragmented and diverse, creating confusion 
and discord that obstructs the emergence of any institution that can take hold as collectively 
accepted. The clarity between the center and the periphery of the field becomes harder to 
decipher, both institutionally and geographically. Institutionally, incumbent power brokers (such 
as academic and scientific bodies) find their positioning diffused as previously fringe actors find 
opportunity to move more centrally into fragmented fields, reaching some populations of 
constituents and excluding others. Geographically, regions of the world become contested as 
their resources become impacted by Anthropocene events. Those places that are not central to 
material, virtual or cultural debates will be disadvantaged and marginalized.  
The main disruptive events in the Collapsing Systems Scenario are around systems 
perceived as key to social life and social order. These include energy, food and water, which are 
linked to natural (material) features of the Anthropocene environment. Examples may include 
the threat of complete water loss in cities like Cape Town, Bogata and Sao Paulo. These 
threatened system can also include virtual ones, such as the internet and access to (and control 
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of) information. Crashes, hacks, bottlenecks, and firewalls are all part of a systems collapse that 
can cascade into other systems areas. Increasing anarchy of access and attention are also forms of 
systems failure as the rapid switching of subjects for political, corporate, and community 
attention become disruptive for planning, budgeting and executing.  
Institutional entrepreneurs under Collapsing Systems are abundant, both in number and 
type. Where twenty years ago, those who started new firms were deemed to be entrepreneurs, in 
this scenario anyone who creates a material, social, or virtual service is an entrepreneur, 
particularly if it goes “viral.” Where institutional entrepreneurs are traditionally those who are 
able to challenge or change current institutions using their entrepreneurial activity (Maguire and 
Hardy, 2009), our political variant of institutional theory treats entrepreneurs as inherently 
motivated by self-interest and use politically-grounded action, yet embrace new modes of control 
(most notably, social media). As such, anyone with a significant and influential following on 
social media embodies a new form of institutional entrepreneur.  This may include those with 
strong presence in Twitter, Facebook, Linked-in or through the creation of blogs or other on-line 
content. The Drudge Report, for example, was able to supplant major media outlets as a source 
of information to broad audiences that sought its specific type of content. 
Dimensional changes in the Collapsing Systems Scenario can be described only in 
temporary terms given the highly unpredictable and increasingly chaotic impacts of the various 
systems interactions. For that reason, this scenario is unstable by definition as the 
disproportionate impacts of environmental disruption become clearer and field structures shift 
with the creation and dissolution of movement constituents. Indeed, the great differentials 
between north and south, polar and equatorial, oceanic and terrestrial, developed and developing 
will exacerbate field level fragmentation. In general terms, key naturally-linked systems (such as 
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power grids, food supply, and water availability) in different parts of the world will likely fail at 
an increasing rate, as has been predicted by international agencies such as the IPCC (2017). 
Various social systems linked via the Web are likely to be disrupted by impinging larger social 
worlds (variants of Facebook, Snapchat, or other social media influences), further drawing the 
attention of societal members away from the natural world as they spend time trying to make 
sense of an overwhelming assault of information from the virtual world.  
 
The Market Rules Scenario.  
In this scenario, which is probably among the most likely, the institutions and values of 
economic and business predominate and environmental redress will only be taken for monetary 
reasons. As a “green” order or logic challenges specific market interests, a compromised 
outcome will lead to the treatment of the environment as an economic asset, valuable for the 
resources it provides to humankind, or as an area where cost reduction and limiting externalities 
are important. Motivations for action would be based on the extent to which they create jobs, 
increase market activity or satisfy other logics of business strategy. The overarching goal of 
continuous economic growth would remain sacrosanct with the environment seen as merely an 
economic input, one levered with innovation and technology, to create growth. Impositions that 
restrict human development would be limited. Conflict and social contest around the emergence 
of Market Rules would take place among pro- and anti-market forces. For those who are 
suspicious of corporate power and particular economic rationales for action, this scenario 
provokes great apprehension (Munir, 2015; Stiglitz, 2012). For those who want to pursue a 
solution to the Anthropocene challenge using presently dominant logics, this Scenario will 
appear to be the most expedient way forward. But, social orders based on market logics are 
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typically of short duration and quite flexible as consumer interests shift and evolve (Thévenot, 
Moody & Lavaye, 2000). 
At the organizational field level, we would see increased power for multi-national 
corporations in defining the reality of society’s impact on planetary boundaries (Bansal & 
Clelland, 2004) but only insofar as they impact wealth for the winners in the market domain. 
Though we can expect certain environmental NGOs to maintain voice in institutional debates by 
introducing green values or orders, they will do so in ways that appeal to specific market 
interests, logics and orders.  As such, we will begin to see some cleavage between incumbent 
firms based on old technologies and new entrants based on new technologies, as can be seen 
today as the fossil-fuel and internal combustion drivetrain sectors face market competition from 
sectors in renewable energy, electric drivetrains and alternative forms of mobility (which are 
themselves supported in various ways by environmental actors and NGOs). As such, consumers 
and market demand would be critical drivers of the direction that this scenario takes. National 
and transnational trade agreements would also become a critical instrument for normalizing our 
collective environmental impact based on a continued belief that market success defines society 
and benefits all. The role of government regulation within Market Rules would lean towards 
libertarian ideals that hesitate to regulate a market externality because of an overarching view 
that we, as humans, cannot design a structure that will appropriately take us in the proper 
direction of human social destiny (Vargish, 1980).  
The institutions and logics of Market Rules are a mere expansion of prior 
institutionalized concepts of corporate environmental concern including pollution control, waste 
minimization, environmental management and corporate sustainability (Greenwood, Jennings & 
Hinings, 2015; Soderstrom & Weber, 2011; World Commission on Environment and 
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Development, 1987; Young & Dhanda, 2013). An attendant belief is that the market always yield 
socially positive outcomes (Cox, 2016) and market success would eventually lead to 
environmental remediation and technologies that reduce our impact on the environment (Simon, 
1981) or even create some environmental benefit (King & Lenox, 2001; Porter & Van der Linde, 
1995). Unfortunately, many metrics of the market agenda, such as Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Return on Investment and discount rates, do not capture the full scope of environmental 
impact and act as limited guideposts for solving the problems we face (Ehrenfeld & Hoffman, 
2013; Hamilton, 2016).  
Disruptive events in Market Rules would not be of an environmental nature, but would be 
those around which the economy is impacted: market collapses, commodity crashes, price 
spikes, and firm failures. Some of these collapses would be due to Anthropocene threshold 
events, such as droughts, storms, floods and fires, but these events will only be engaged in terms 
of short term monetary horizons (Slawinski, Pinske, Busch & Banerjee, 2017). As such, the 
interests of actors with low or no voice in market oriented fields (such as disadvantaged urban 
communities and developing countries with limited economic base) will be minimized. Only 
those voices whose market interests are threatened would enjoy legitimate voice (such as 
consumers, merchants and sellers). 
The entrepreneurs who would be more influential in defining these events will be those 
who can articulate their monetary and strategic importance; and in particular, to those segments 
of society whose financial interests are threatened by Anthropocene impacts or those who can 
profit from them by serving specific and legitimate markets, such as those providing grass-fed 
beef (Weber et al., 2008) or organic wines (Delmas & Grant, 2014) today. Companies providing 
new climate saving products such as electric cars (e.g. Tesla) and rooftop solar arrays (e.g. Solar 
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City) will enjoy greater success as they know how to use market rules (or manipulate them) in 
order to produce these goods and serving those consumers who desire them. As such, Market 
Rules is a scenario that engages the economic elites to the exclusion of vast segments of the 
global population. Insurance firms and management consultants, in particular, would help this 
business framing to emerge, monetizing Anthropocene events as business opportunities or risks 
(Kim et al., 2013).  
The dimensional changes in this scenario will be a reversed trajectory of some specific 
aspects of planetary boundaries as measured by economic indicators (e.g. GDP). But the broader 
reversals where no economic, or “business case” is viable will be overlooked. The overall import 
and urgency of Anthropocene issues on a planetary scale would be diminished as merely the 
same as problems that corporations have faced in the past (Wright & Nyberg, 2015; 2016). 
Under Market Rules, the velocity at which society is heading towards systems collapse may 
diminish, but the direction and inevitability of that collapse will not be averted (Ehrenfeld & 
Hoffman, 2013).  
 
The Cultural Re-Enlightenment Scenario.  
This scenario is, in many ways, the opposite of Collapsing Systems. In the Re-Enlightenment 
scenario, the foundational elements of our institutional order are reexamined, compelling change 
deep within the structures of our collective understanding of the world around us (Hoffman & 
Ehrenfeld, 2013). This would involve a cultural transition of perspective akin to the 
Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries (Hoffman & Jennings, 2011) which was built on a 
shift from perceiving nature as subsuming the human endeavor, to one in which humankind 
embarked on the “conquest of nature” (Mirzoeff, 2014). But the Anthropocene Era is an 
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acknowledgement that the scientific method that was essential to the Enlightenment is no longer 
fully adequate to understand the natural world and our impact upon it. Instead, we would come to 
recognize that: “The Anthropocene is not a problem for which there can be a solution. Rather, it 
… signals a profound shift in the human relation to the planet that questions the very foundations 
of these frameworks themselves” (Rowan, 2014, p. 9). The exact form of this variant of 
Anthropocene Society is more winding, its directions are more difficult to anticipate, and its 
timescale is much longer than the other three scenarios. But it emphasizes the premise that 
changes to societal beliefs and practice are necessary for a full adjustment to the Anthropocene 
era. As such, the Cultural Re-Enlightenment scenario is meant to depict a broader culture shift 
that represents some sort of multiplicative variant of Market Rules that emerges over a long time 
period. It does not represent the dominance of environmental values or a green order per se.  
Rather it represents a broad cultural shift based on compromise for a more durable agreement 
among all domains of social activity where each conforms and compromises with the interests 
and logics of the other.   
The organizational field of Cultural Re-Enlightenment will include a constellation of 
actors who are more varied, diverse and vertically structured than in the other scenarios. There 
would be a hierarchical arrangement among organizational groups, with science education, 
ethical action, religion and community responsibility organizations at the apex (Karlsson, 2013) 
and economic growth or technocratic engineering being directed by their focus. In some ways, 
we might expect the operation of state-level institutions and critiques of the market (Piketty, 
2014; Sachs, 2008; Weber, Davis & Lounsbury, 2009) to lead to a renewed focus on the 
consideration of nation-state legitimacy and global integration. Further, we might expect many 
voices emerging from new and distinct domains that include less prominent voices using means 
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and channels that lie outside the contemporary mainstream. Other presently marginalized groups 
will similarly enter field level discourse, many using new forums and channels such as the 
internet (Howard et al, 2011; Stepanova, 2011).  
The institutions and logics of Cultural Re-Enlightenment will be marked by new 
institutions and social arrangements for coordination (Galaz et al., 2012; Johnson and 
Morehouse, 2014), predicated on the idea that the market and technology are merely the 
proximate cause of our dominating influence on the environment. Ultimately it is our social 
beliefs and values that define their purpose, role, form and impact (Bazerman & Hoffman, 1999). 
This path emphasizes that changes in social structures are required to lead to a better human 
future through better governance (Biermann et al., 2012), values and beliefs (Alcaraz et al., 
2016) and a variety of new or amended societal institutions (Hoffman & Jennings, 2015; Hulme, 
2009). Over the longer-term, this trajectory of Anthropocene Society will bring contemporary 
considerations for sustainability into a new orientation, one that requires, not an adjustment of 
social systems to the limits set by the biosphere, but recognition of the planetary boundaries 
beyond which social systems should not go but already have, leading to new forms of moral 
reasoning (Ellis & Trachtenberg, 2013) and “a shared view of human and Earth histories [that] 
calls for a renewed engagement with ethics” (Schmidt, Brown & Orr, 2016), most notably within 
the domains of religious values (Pope Francis, 2015) and personal ethics (Jonas, 1973).  
In fact, we may be seeing early signs of the emergence of such changes through 
documents such as Pope Francis’s encyclical letter Laudato Si (2015), which seeks to bring 
ecological considerations into Catholic social teaching. In that document, the pope 
acknowledged that our “way of understanding human life and activity has gone awry, to the 
serious detriment of the world around us” and that “a new way of thinking about human beings, 
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life, society and our relationship with nature” is necessary to protect our “common home.” The 
values projected in this document were subsequently echoed by Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and 
Buddhist leaders that offered similar messages in their faith traditions.   
Global environmental governance will move towards supporting, coordinating and 
regulating “the introduction of novel technologies, management practices, organizational 
structures and institutional solutions that profoundly change the system in which they arise” 
(Galaz et al., 2012, p. 84). Possible normative responses would involve a greater awareness and 
understanding of human and natural systems and the modelling and monitoring of dynamics 
within and across them (Galaz et al. 2012) such as a move towards carbon neutrality and then 
towards carbon negativity. More pointedly, Cultural Re-Enlightenment may signal “the limits of 
the neoliberal market for adequately and sustainably dealing with the major environmental 
threats we face” (Palsson et al., 2013, p. 9), with more attention to unprecedented levels of global 
cooperation based on a new sense of global ethics around collective responsibility and social 
equity.  
Disruptive events within the Cultural Re-Enlightenment Scenario will be viewed and 
interpreted as “cultural anomalies” that will compel action to question taken for granted 
assumptions about our relation to nature (Hoffman & Jennings, 2011). Events like hurricanes, the 
breakup of ice sheets, the opening of the Northwest Passage, or California’s multi-year drought 
will emphasize broad scale systems failures and will compel the mobilization of resources and 
action over meaning construction. The constituencies that engage in the debate around the 
definition of these events will be re-ordered from past configurations that created uncertainty and 
confusion towards trusted expertise in interpreting their meaning.  
The main entrepreneurs for establishing these new Anthropocene institutions and 
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practices will be more localized with social experiments emerging to find new ways of thinking 
and living that challenge outmoded and historic ways of knowing the world around us. These 
entrepreneurs would be focused on behavioral education, value appeals and regional policy 
implementation. They would likely lead to somewhat vociferous social movements, which would 
vie with those advocating for more individual freedom (e.g. libertarian groups). In the process, 
capitalism would be transformed and new forms of “market” exchange would be developed that 
involve broad scale systemic change (Ehrenfeld & Hoffman, 2013; Schnaiberg & Gould, 2000).  
Dimensional changes within Cultural Re-Enlightenment would include a shift in the 
trajectory of our approach to planetary boundaries, which would be addressed at a more 
foundational level than in the other scenarios, but not in such an immediate, targeted and 
rationalized fashion. It is an approach that moves well beyond the goals of the Brundtland 
Commission definition of sustainable development that continues on the same path of economic 
development and approaches. Instead it moves towards what Ehrenfeld (2009) refers to as 
Flourishing, “meaning not only to grow, but to grow well, to prosper, to thrive, to live to the 
fullest. It is a dynamic word, representing change and striving, not the static sentiment that is 
projected by the word sustainable, but a constant reaching for what it truly means to be a human 
being living in an interconnected and complex world. It is a future built not just on technological 
and material development, but also on cultural, psychological, and spiritual growth.” 
Interestingly, given the normative and constantly evolving nature of this archetypal 
Anthropocene future, those experiencing Cultural Re-Enlightenment will continually debate and 
redefine acceptable planetary boundaries to reflect a less instrumental determination.  
 
Discussion 
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We have presented our political variant of institutional theory, focusing on a specific set of 
institutional dimensions, and we have applied this political variant to Anthropocene Society to 
generate three scenarios, each with implications for both human and natural systems. Our 
theoretical framework has implications for research and practice. We offer four below – further 
study of the mix of scenarios, disruptive events, resistance to change and pace of change.   
 
The Mix of Scenarios.  
A first area for theorizing, empirical study, and practitioner consideration is the three scenarios, 
which anchor our contribution to thinking about Anthropocene Society and need further 
theoretical formulation and investigation. While derived from extant work and social 
observation, the scenarios are theoretically diverse. Like logics and orders, each scenario is 
encompassing of more than one specific field and spills over into other social domains. Yet like 
social orders, each scenario entails types of beliefs, related social structures, and actions. 
Furthermore, they are part of a domain that is under-theorized in institutional theory as a generic 
logic or order: the environment (Jennings & Hoffman, 2017) or green order (Thévenot, Moody & 
Lavaye, 2000). So, each scenario may be a unique domain or it may encompass other domains, 
such as the market, community or religion. If the latter is true, then each scenario itself would 
appear to rely on a dominant logic, but one that is complemented by others, including one based 
on environmental values. If the former is true, some key empirical questions for investigation 
become evident around what type of scenario predominates in today’s Anthropocene Society, 
and what might we envision for the future. Answering such questions requires the recognition 
that some scenarios represent archetypes, which are pure forms based on the dominance of one 
set of logics or orders and the submission of other, less powerful logics or orders. So, any 
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assessment of the present or future requires the recognition that we may have a mix of forms and 
will be built on a bricolage of prior scenarios and archetypes that constitute, not a single social 
order, but an interweaving of multiple orders that emerge through political contest (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006).  
An examination of their multiple forms in the present would require measuring the 
different logics and orders using survey data of course measures of the dimensions answered by 
a large number of respondents in different countries. We would expect large regional and 
demographic variations in the types of logics and orders held. It would also be intriguing to 
know whether individuals and groups held more than one logic or order, under what conditions 
and how (and why) they change over time. An examination of possible futures also requires 
additional empirical investigation into the evolving structures just discussed. Key elements, such 
as who has voice and how disruptive events might change that field level structure can guide the 
imagining of several possible scenarios. Future realities will be sewn together into a partially 
sensible pattern, moving beyond a high degree of rationalism found in original expressions of 
institutional theory (Parsons, 1937; Weber, 1919), and towards more flexible, paradoxical and 
bounded rationalities (March & Olsen, 1989). This treatment will also allow for hybrid practices 
and forms, which twenty years ago would have been considered a flawed outcome of a partially 
failed institutional process. The tracking of relative levels of confusion and stress associated with 
various terms and their clusters (Lefsrud, Graves & Phillips, 2014) will be more important than 
the tracking of any rational discourse around these themes.  
 
Disruptive Events.  
A second area for consideration is around disruptive events. In our political variant of 
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institutional theory, disruptive events play a large role at the interface of the field and specific 
institutions within it. This is even more true where the Anthropocene is concerned, for the events 
are more frequent and linked in moving constellations. Theoretically, it would be intriguing to 
explore whether such constellations will continue to be seen as increasingly disruptive events, or 
more normalized occurrences (e.g. the “new normal”), and hence require more frequency or 
amplitude to capture attention. In part, this depends on the theory of organizational and 
individual attention used, for some versions of institutional analysis argue that bounded 
rationality leads to saturation and sequential attention, while others argue that learning leads to 
reconfiguration of events so that they can be apprehended (March & Olsen, 1989; Ocasio, 1996).  
For instance, climate change is linked to temperature rises, ice melting, sea-level rise, 
flooding, droughts, and peak storm events. But these weather anomalies are often disputed by 
segments of society as being the result of normal weather variation and not a human induced 
shift in the biosphere. So, what will be the perceived constellation? In fact, when it comes to 
disruptive events, the framing and called-for actions of institutional entrepreneurs are likely to 
play a particularly large role in how such events work within any particular scenario, for the 
threats may only be seen once they are framed as problems. So, it may be that the spawning rates 
of new ENGOs and the diversity of their domains, will become a practical indicator for the 
direction being taken by Anthropocene Society.  
 
Resistance to Change.  
A third area for consideration is cultural resistance to change, particularly to those efforts by 
institutional entrepreneurs. In each scenario, there are those who gain and those who lose 
political, ideological or economic status and resources and will therefore be resistant to the 
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emergence of the norms, values and beliefs of that scenario. In our theoretical framework, we did 
not specify these sources of resistance explicitly, but noted that every scenario involved interest 
and agency, and therefore inequities. Theoretically, this becomes a bit problematic, as varying 
forces of resistance would prevent the move away from any particular scenario and into Cultural 
Re-Enlightenment, depending on whose interests are served or stressed. We might expect, for 
example, that general critics, business executives and scientists would be the source of resistance 
to improvements in the Collapsing Systems and Market Rules Scenarios respectively as efforts 
seek the move towards the Cultural Re-Enlightenment scenario. So, there is a theoretical 
opportunity for specifying how resistance works in each scenario.  
 
Pace of Change.  
A fourth area for study is temporality or the pace of change. The Anthropocene, as noted in the 
introduction, is based on conceptualizations that look deep into our past, present, and near future. 
The Planetary Boundary perspective to which we subscribe uses notions of exponential change 
and thresholds, which raises the issue of time more dramatically. So, the time scale, temporal 
knock-on effects, and threshold points of change are all important to specify in future research 
studies. One difficulty in doing so is that we do not have good global level theory for linked 
systems like weather, water, and food (Stafford- Smith et al., 2016), making thresholds and peak 
events only observable post hoc (Kolbert, 2014; Rockstrom et al., 2009). In the bigger picture, 
temporality would also require different possible conceptions of time that are more in keeping 
with each scenario (Lawrence et al, 2002). In each case, temporal scales and modes vary and 
boundaries are marked by clear milestone indicators. The Collapsing Systems Scenario is 
inherently based on non-linear, accelerating thresholds across linked dimensions; whereas the 
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Market Rules Scenario may use temporal scales based on business cycles and, Cultural Re-
Enlightenment Scenario may be based on a circular, longwave scale (Bansal & DesJardine, 
2014).  
Finally, we might expect each scenario to be more or less durable and open to change.  
Market Rules, for example, may be the most unstable as it rests on economic dominance and will 
shift with the whims and desires of the market.  Collapsing Systems will be maintained as long 
as disruptive forces and actors hold power and resources to continue obstructing collaboration 
and compromise.  Cultural Re-enlightenment may be the most durable but the most difficult to 
attain as it rests on compromise among multiple interests and orders of society. 
 
Conclusion 
The predominant focus of organizational research on organizations and the natural environment 
has treated natural systems as distinct from social systems (Ehrenfeld, 2009). As such, it has 
been approached as an external constraint where corrective efforts seek to merge environmental 
concerns with anthropocentric considerations for human interests, most notably by exploring 
how companies can protect the environment by pursuing the goal of gaining market advantage 
(Russo & Minto, 2012; Shrivastava 1995). Much of this research has been normative in focus, 
focusing on improving “eco-efficiency” and understanding and predicting why and how 
corporations "can take steps forward toward [being] environmentally more sustainable" (Starik & 
Marcus, 2000, p. 542).  
And yet, for all these efforts, researchers within the natural and physical sciences have 
made it clear that we are pursuing the wrong goals. Continuing efforts at eco-efficiency without 
consideration for the systemic aspects of the causes of our environmental problems will not yield 
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solutions (Ehrenfeld & Hoffman, 2013). The environmental problems will only get worse. As 
such, the shift to the Anthropocene renders prior research objectives to be misguided and 
inadequate for addressing the magnitude of the challenge before us. As a correction, we hope to 
contribute to the long-term need to combine Naturewissenshaften with Kulturewissenshaften, a 
central concern in Weber’s work (Weber, 1949), and to use theory and research to inform 
reflexive practice and policy. In this way, a linkage of natural and physical science theories of 
the Anthropocene must, by definition, change the paradigm under which current research in 
environmental and social sustainability takes place. But this paradigm shift comes with particular 
challenges for the scholar, one that many have begun to undertake through both research 
(Dickens. 2001) and action (e.g. Economics for the Anthropocene: Re-grounding the 
Human/Earth Relationship, a partnership between McGill, the University of Vermont, and York 
University).   
 
The Conflicted Role of the Scholar in the Anthropocene.  
In closing out our assessment, we wish to acknowledge that we might be accused of being rather 
cold and overly analytic for studying an issue that threatens to irreparably damage our physical 
and social worlds. We concur, acknowledging that the reality of the Anthropocene is highly 
emotive in nature and that the grand challenge is an overwhelming burden at many levels of 
social life. While institutional theory often strives for normative detachment from the empirical 
domains which it studies, this issue requires a more attached approach. As such, we wish to 
move away from the benign neutrality of most institutional analyses to argue that there are better 
and worse Anthropocene Societies to which we should aspire.  
Regardless of which Anthropocene future emerges, deteriorating natural systems, at least 
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for the immediate term, are likely a given, leading to an assessment that a “good Anthropocene” 
may no longer be possible (Hamilton, 2014; Revkin, 2014). Ultimately, while some may 
temporarily gain in a future in which the effects of the Anthropocene manifest themselves (e.g. 
some northern latitudes may temporarily enjoy increased plant growth and crop land), the 
majority of the world’s human and non-human inhabitants will lose in any Anthropocene Society 
where natural systems deteriorate. Similarly, responses to such global change will also create an 
asymmetry of interests and values in Anthropocene Society. As a result, the conceptualization of 
both the era and society will be politically contested and continually open to exploitation 
(Zalasiewicz, Williams, Steffen & Crutzen, 2010).  
But as both scholars and human beings, we would be incomplete in our analysis if we did 
not take a normative stance on the desirability of Cultural Re-Enlightenment over Collapsing 
Systems, and a careful critique of Market Rules as a long term solution to the Anthropocene 
issues we face. While the Market Rules Scenario is somewhat positive, the impact on nature is 
uneven and still leaves us teetering periodically on the edge of Collapsing Systems, and with 
large inequities across segments of society. So, it would seem that some aspect of the Cultural 
Re-Enlightenment scenario would be important to have a flourishing, constructive Anthropocene 
Society, a world where we have at least some success in wrestling with social and environmental 
breakdowns and inequities that are evident today.  
Such a normative stand leaves the scholar of Anthropocene Society in a bit of a bind 
(Hoffman & Jennings, 2015). The urgency and magnitude of the Anthropocene puts the scholar’s 
professional and personal interests at odds. We need to both fit the phenomena within existing 
theory in order to contribute to the field (and maintain legitimacy within the academy through 
publication, promotion and tenure) and step outside the domains of existing theory to fully 
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capture the magnitude and scope of the problem. The first is to begin to mitigate the impact we 
are having on the environment. It is polite, acceptable and unchallenging to the systems of 
practice and the academy. The second is to re-energize and re-radicalize the field (Gladwin, 
2012; Starik & Kanashiro, 2013) by moving outside of mainstream scholarship and practice by 
criticizing and challenging the underlying institutions of the field. The Anthropocene Era calls 
for scholars to do that again, to enter the realm of creative destruction, to question taken for 
granted metrics and concepts, to be impolite and to challenge existing power structures in both 
society and academia. Rather than merely fitting scholarship within existing management 
theories and models, this new work in institutional theory must explore the ways in which the 
fundamental systems of thinking and beliefs must adapt to the present-day realities of the 
Anthropocene. The goal today for forward-looking scholars is to do both and in so doing, 
advance theory and address the societal implications of the shift to the Anthropocene era. 
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Table 1: 
Adjustments to Institutional Theory in Light of the Anthropocene  
Institutional 
Elements 
Mainstream Institutional Theory Political-Institutional Variant 
Organizational 
Fields 
A community of organizations that partakes of a 
common meaning system and whose participants 
interact more frequently and fatefully with one 
another than with actors outside the field. Fields 
tend towards isomorphism, the static, and the 
status quo. 
A relational space where multiple and often competing 
interests engage with other actors who may hold divergent 
ideas about the nature of the world around them. Those 
without voice (such as the disempowered, the environment, 
and future generations) must be included, bringing 
environmental justice to the fore. Fields tend towards dynamic 
domains of instability and flux. 
Institutions and 
Logics 
Patterns of belief and practice that are taken for 
granted, including specific rules, norms, or 
logics. A logic exists within different generic 
social domains, such as the market, the State, 
and the family. Institutions determine what 
issues within the field are perceived as important 
and what actions are appropriate. 
Taken for granted sets of beliefs and practices that inherently 
reflect interest and agency. Every logic within a field 
ensconces power relations and solidifies inequalities. Interest, 
agency, types of control, and methods of contestation are 
either defined by the dominant logic(s) or shaped by them. 
Disruptive Events Shocks or triggers that create contradictions 
within the social environment and force 
organizations to re-theorize their surroundings. 
Shocks or triggers that increase in frequency and 
interdependency, becoming constellations. Incumbent power 
interests attempt to smooth them over if they challenge their 
legitimacy and have them accepted as (the new) normal. 
Institutional 
Entrepreneurs 
Social agents who challenge and/or change 
current institutions, including overarching 
logics. 
Social agents who define and leverage disruptive events and 
the interests of actors. They overcome resistance in order to 




Ignored in general theory, though many specific 
studies examine Anthropocene events, such as 
climate change. 
Changes within and across the planetary boundaries, with 
implications for the advantaged and disadvantaged groups 
affected. 
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Table 2: 
Three Scenarios for Anthropocene Societies  
Institutional Elements Scenarios 
 Collapsing Systems  
 
Market Rules Cultural Re-Enlightenment 
Organizational Fields Fields are increasingly 
interdependent and organized 
around power. 
Fields are market-oriented, and 
often divided by new vs. old 
economy.  
Hierarchical field around science 
education, ethical action, religion 
and community responsibility. 
Institutions and Logics Competing mega-institutions at the 
core with overlap of different fields, 
vying to coordinate them. 
Strong new national and 
transnational trade institutions that 
link market success to 
environmental remediation and 
adaptation.  
Powerful new local, national and 
transnational norms for behavior; 
recognized national and 
international sources or outlets for 
Anthropocene information 
Disruptive Events Distribution problems of key 
societal inputs, including people, 
food, water, and housing are an 
issue. Cultural fabric is increasingly 
shredded by violence and disrepair. 
Events are framed as market issues 
based on economic implications, 
such as commodity use, energy 
prices and production yield.  
Events are framed as social failures, 
requiring a reassessment of the 
disconnect between our historic 
norms of action and emergent 
values around environmental 
stewardship. Human impacts are 
perceived in moral terms.  
Institutional 
Entrepreneurs 
Different forms of systems 
entrepreneurs try to promote their 
interests within specific institutions 
by taking advantage of systems 
failures. 
Market entrepreneurs who embrace 
environmental entrepreneurship. 
 
Education, social and policy 




Collapse of key naturally-linked 
systems (power grids, food, water) 
in different parts of the world, at an 
increasing rate, with accelerating 
unpredictability. Concurrent 
breakdown in social institutions. 
Reversed trajectory of specific 
aspects of planetary boundaries as 
measured by economic indicators 
(e.g. GDP). Broader reversals where 
no economic, or “business case” is 
viable are overlooked.  
Progress in most dimensions, 
ordered normatively, with 
remediation leading society into 
safe zone dimensions of planetary 
boundaries. 
 
